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so it would seem that the decision might have gone the other way.
Either the doctrine of Evans v. Lewis could be disregarded in the field
of preferences and the tort claimant be considered a creditor and allowed
to upset the preference, or, should the court wish to follow the doctrine
to which it professes to its logical conclusion, the tort claimant, having
reduced his claim to a judgment and attained the status of a "subsequent
creditor" should be allowed to overturn the mortgage made with intent
to prefer another creditor over him, specifically. The question seems to
be a novel one in Ohio and authority elsewhere is lacking because of the
lack of similar statutes.
The disappointed tort claimant has other means of asserting his
right. The first is the Federal Bankruptcy Act. While the non-judg-
ment tort claimant cannot be a petitioning creditor,' he does have a
claim which is provable in bankruptcy."0 Other creditors can file the
petition and the preference (if within four months) can be recovered
for the benefit of all the creditors including the tort claimant with a suit
pending at the time of the petition. He has also a remedy under the
Ohio statute. Any other creditor could have a receiver appointed to hold
the preference for all the creditors. The tort claimant would share in
the fund once he had reduced his claim to judgment."
R.C.H.
EQUITY
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN EQUITABLE DEFENSES AND
EQUITABLE COUNTERCLAIMS- THE EFFECT
OF EITHER ON A JURY TRIAL
The plaintiff brought an action on a promissory note against two
signers, Payer and Stanton, which note was secured by a mortgage
of even date on certain property described therein. Defendant Stanton
filed his answer admitting liability thereon. Defendant Payer filed an
answer containing two defenses. The first defense denied that the
plaintiff was the owner of the note, that all the credits for payments
appear on the note and that he was liable on the note. The second
defense the defendant described as a counterclaim and cross petition.
The counterclaim set up facts indicating that his signature on the note
and the mortgage which secured the note were obtained by fraud, and
concluding with a claim for damages in the sum of $14,536.31. The
Chandler Act, sec. s9b (1 9 3 S).
1' Chandler Act, Eec. 63 (7) (x938).
'Lally v. Farr, 9 Ohio Dec. 119 (xS8 9 ).
321NOTES AND COMMENTS
322 LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1940
cross petition prayed that the note be delivered up and cancelled. The
cause was tried to the court over the demands of the plaintiff and the
other defendant for a jury trial. This was reversed on appeal, it being
held that an equitable defense does not change an action at law to
one of equity and that it was error to refuse the plaintiff a jury trial.'
The defendant claims that his defense was by way of counterclaim
and cross petition; the court says it was merely an equitable defense.
Two interesting questions are raised by these pleadings: (i) what is
the difference between an equitable defense and an equitable counter-
claim; (2) what is the effect of either on a jury trial.
In order to more clearly understand the nature of an equitable
defense, the conflict between law and equity prior to the codes should
be noted. At common law, in an action on a specialty, for example,
all defenses not in the instrument itself were excluded, for the reason
that the specialty was the contract in itself.' The result of this was
that if the specialty had been induced by fraud, the defendant had
no defense at law. Equity was the ready friend aiding those who could
not maintain a defense at law for such reasons by granting an injunction
against the maintenance of the action at law. Because of this injunctive
process the equity courts and the law courts engaged in a bitter struggle,
which ended in the famous Coke-Ellsmore dispute upholding the right
of equity to enjoin actions at law.3 What was the purpose of going
into equity to obtain that injunction? While it looks like an affirmative
action its real purpose was defensive, that is, to enjoin the plaintiff's
cause of action.
Most states have abolished the distinction in form between law
courts and chancery courts and as a result we find statutes like the
Ohio statute,- providing that the defendant may set up as many defenses,
counterclaims or set-offs as he has, whether legal or equitable. " What
does this type of statute mean? Professor Cook says this type of statute
was meant to abolish the old procedure and to permit the invalidity of
the instrument to be pleaded in an action at law.5 From this interpre-
tation of the statute and from knowledge of the procedure under
separate courts of law and equity, a definition of an equitable defense
may be drawn: facts which prior to the code would have entitled a
defendant to go into equity and obtain a permanent injunction against
the maintenance of the action at law, may now be set up as a defense
to the action at law.
'Blair v. Payer, 63 Ohio App. 29, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 4, 16 Ohio Op. 263 (1939).
2WALSH, EQUITY (1930) p. 99, n..
3 Supra, note 2.
'OHIo GENERAL ConE, sec. 11315.
'Cook, Equitable Defenses (1932) 32 YALE L.J. 64-5.
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In Brymer v. Clark,6 the court said that "the defendant in an action
upon an award may set up as a defense thereto any matter which con-
stitutes a good ground in equity for setting aside or cancelling the
award." In an action on a note, the defendant answered saying that
the note was procured by fraud, was without consideration and asked
that it be cancelled. The court in that case said: "The equitable relief
asked by the defendant's (answer) . . .was the cancellation of the
note sued upon. The grounds upon which the relief was asked con-
stituted a perfect defense to the action at law which had been brought
by the plaintiff. . . . The general rule in such case undoubtedly is,
that where a party has a complete defense at law, he cannot resort to
equity."' This is carried on in Rothman v. Engel,' the court saying
that "facts that are strictly defensive, and which, if pleaded as a defense
in an action at law, would operate to defeat the plaintiff's right to
recover, do not constitute a counterclaim. And if the defendant does
not avail himself of such defense, he will be barred from utilizing it
in a subsequent suit." Hence, since cancellation is strictly defensive in
nature it may be included in the definition stated previously. Thus
the definition of an equitable defense could now be said to be this:
facts which prior to the code would entitle the defendant to go into
equity to have an instrument cancelled and a permanent injunction
issued or merely to have a permanent injunction issued would constitute
an equitable defense. It is, as the court said in Gill v. Pelkey,9 "simply
a defense to the cause of action in the petition."
An equitable counterclaim on the other hand is a cross action in
itself, on which a separate action might have been maintained, which
if successful -ill extinguish or supersede the case made in the petition."
A counterclaim is described by the statute as being "a cause of action
existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff or another de-
fendant, or both between whom a several judgment might be had in
an action, and arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the
petition as the foundation of plaintiff's claim or connected with the
subject of the action."'"
zo Ohio St. 231 (x8 7o).7 Quebec Bank of Toronto, Ontario v. Weyand & Jung, 30 Ohio St. iz6 (1876).
8 97 Ohio St. 77, xi9 N.E. 25o (3917).
054 Ohio St. 348, 360, 43 N.E. 99z (iS96). Other cases discussing the problem
of equitable defenses as distinguished from equitable counterclaims are: Brymer v. Clark,
20 Ohio St., Z31 (1870)5 Rothman v. Engel, supra, note 85 Patterson v. Volmar, 131
Ohio St. 4S, s N.E. (zd) 323 (1936); Gowdy v. Roberts, 31 Ohio App. 33, 35 (19z9);
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. MeKeegue, z26 Vise. 574, xo5 N.W. 1030 (s9o6)5 Susque-
hanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Anderson & Company, 239 N.Y. z85, 146 N.E. 381 (19ZS);
Vm. Wreisman Realty Co. v. Cohen, 157 Minn. 161, 595 N.W. 898 (1923).
" Gill v. Pelkey, 54 Ohio St. 348, 43 N.E. 99! (1896).
'Ohio General Code, sec. 1'317.
To illustrate what is meant, suppose A sues B to recover for the
breach of the covenants in a deed of conveyance, the breach being an
eviction of the plaintiff from part of the premises. B denies the eviction
and as a counterclaim sets up the contention that the covenants were
inserted by mistake and prays for a correction of that mistake. Is this
answer merely defensive or does it ask for affirmative relief in addition?
It is obvious that it is more than a defense because it will not only defeat
the plaintiff's action but will deprive the plaintiff of his action. That
is to say, the defendant is asking for a correction of a mistake which
if granted would settle the controversy and determine the rights of
the parties. Thus, in the case of Buckner v. Mear, 12 where this exact
situation was decided, the court said that it would be an equitable
counterclaim if the answer set up an equitable cause of action which,
if established, would extinguish or supersede the case made out in the
petition.
In Dodsworth v. Hopple,'3 the defendant, in answer to an action
to recover possession of land, set up facts showing he was entitled to
conveyance, and prayed it be conveyed and title quieted. The court said
that this was an equitable counterclaim, that "it seeks affirmative relief
on a broader scope than the mere defeat of plaintiff's action for the
possession of the land; it seeks also to quiet the defendant's title, by
securing to him the legal as well as equitable right thereto." Further
on the court said, "(the facts) are such, that had the plaintiffs discon-
tinued their action, or failed to appear, the defendant, under the provi-
sions of the code, might have proceeded to trial and judgment on his
cross petition, in the same manner as if it had been an original petition."
This case permits a form of definition to be drawn: thus, it may be said
that an equitable counterclaim is an affirmative action on the part of
the defendant which may be the subject of an action independent of
the plaintiff's action, and which has as its purpose not the mere defense
to a cause of action, but the depriving the plaintiff of his cause of action.
The difference between an equitable defense and an equitable counter-
claim may be stated, as did the court in Gill v. Pelkey,14 that one "is
simply a defense to the cause of action in the petition, while the other
is a cross-demand constituting a cause of action in itself, on which a
separate action might have been maintained."
In the principal case the defendant sets up as his first defense what
he calls a counterclaim, that is, the plaintiff set up facts alleging fraud
and false representations in procuring his signature and in procuring
12z6 Ohio St. 514 (1875).
2 33 Ohio St. x6 (1877).
x' Gill v. Pelkey, supra, note io.
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the mortgage and in addition had asked for damages. Under the defini-
tion stated earlier and under the cases, fraud and false representation
are now equitable defenses to the action at law, and where a party has a
complete defense at law he cannot resort to equity.' 5 The second defense
is a cross petition asking for cancellation of the note. Now the ground
on which the defendant here would have to sustain his suit for cancella-
tion if it had been brought as an independent action are fraud and false
representation, the same facts as in his counterclaim. But fraud and
false representations are defenses to an action at law; consequently, the
defendant has a good defense to the action at law without the help of
equity, and his defense cannot be an equitable countreclaim. It must be
designated as an equitable defense. Hence, it would seem that the form
of the answer is immaterial, and that the nature of the case determines
whether or not the defense is an equitable defense or an equitable
counterclaim.
A second question arises and that is, what effect, if any, does an
equitable defense or an equitable counterclaim have on the right to a
trial by jury. In regard to an equitable defense the problem may be
dismissed by saying that it has no effect whatsoever on the right to a
jury trial. The courts have uniformly held that an equitable defense
does not change the mode of trial.'6 Thus, if the plaintiff's action is
one which entitles him to a jury, there will be a jury trial, unless waived,
regardless of whether or not an equitable defense has been imposed.
On the other hand an equitable counterclaim does change the mode
of trial.' In Gill v. Pelkey" the court said that an equitable counter-
claim asking affirmative relief will draw to it the mode of trial appro-
priate to such cause of action. It not only changes the mode of trial
to the appropriate action, but it requires a trial in advance of the trial
on the plaintiff's claim.' 9 Since this is a separate trial the manner in
which the case shall be appealed arises, and this is answered by saying
that, if the case was one that would have been tried in a chancery court
prior to the code of civil procedure then it may be appealed on questions
'Supra, note 7.
" Quebec Bank of Toronto, Ontario v. weyand & Jung, supra, note 7. However,
in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 26o U.S. z35, 67 L. Ed. 232 (x92), the
court ,aid that if an equitable defense is set forth against a suit at law, the equitable
isue 'hould be first tried to a court. Thus, the court is saying that an equitable defense
doe_. change the mode of trial. The court cites three Ohio cases to substantiate this
ruling, but it is submitted that under the analysis of equitable defenses and counter-
claim,- -set forth in this article the cases cited are not equitable defenses but equitable
counterclaims.
'
T ilassie v. Stradford, 17 Ohio St. 596 (i567)5 Dodsworth v. Hopple, 33 Ohio
St. x6 (1877)5 Lust v. The Farmers Bank & Savings Co., xI4 Ohio St. 31z (s926).
x 54 Ohio St. 348, 43 N.E. 991 (1896).
Dodsworth v. Hopple, supra, note 17.
of law and fact; otherwise, it would be appealed on questions of law."0
This historical interpretation has not been applied to the determination
of the right to a jury trial. Under Ohio G.C., Section 11379 all actions
for money only, or for the recovery of specific real or personal property
are entitled to a jury trial. The statute limits the right to a jury trial
to these specific instances whether historically legal or equitable, so that
some cases historically equitable may have a jury trial as of right. The
equitable counterclaim historically is an affirmative action in equity.
Now if the historical distinction does not apply to the right to a jury
trial, it may theoretically be that in some instances the defendant plead-
ing an equitable counterclaim may be entitled to a jury trial under the
statute. However, if we assume that the action is equitable and does
not fall within the classification of Ohio G.C. Section 11379, and the
plaintiff's action is one entitled to a jury, what effect does the counter-
claim have? In Buckner v. Mear1 it is said that even though the plain-
tiff's cause of action is triable by a jury, if the answer constitutes an
equitable cause of action which if established will extinguish or supersede
the plaintiff's cause of action, the new issues are triable to the court
and not as a matter of right to the jury. Thus, it may be said that an
equitable counterclaim, unless it falls within the requirements of Ohio
G.C. Section 11379, will not admit of a trial by jury as of right. It
is an independent action calling to it its own mode of trial.
In the principal case it would seem that the court was right in re-
quiring a jury trial. The plaintiff's action was one at law for money
only and entitled to a jury trial unless changed by an equitable counter-
claim in the defendant's answer. However, the answer in the principal
case was an equitable defense and could not, therefore, change the mode
of trial. Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial and it
was error to allow a trial to the court. F.A.R.
INSURANCE
INSURANCE - BANKRUPTCY - RIGHTS OF INJURED PARTY'
TO PROCEED AGAINST THE INSURER
Morris, Inc., an Ohio corporation engaged in the business of inter-
state hauling, carried liability insurance with the defendant company for
the benefit of shippers using its service. On February 25, 1936, mer-
chandise consigned to the plaintiff was destroyed in transit. Morris, Inc.
filed a petition in bankruptcy and was duly adjudged a bankrupt on
'Supra, notes 9 and 16; OHIo GENERAL CODE, Sec. 12223-I.
26 Ohio St. 54 (1875).
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